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Abstract
Recent advances in Deep Learning show the existence
of image-agnostic quasi-imperceptible perturbations that
when applied to ‘any’ image can fool a state-of-the-art net-
work classifier to change its prediction about the image
label. These ‘Universal Adversarial Perturbations’ pose
a serious threat to the success of Deep Learning in prac-
tice. We present the first dedicated framework to effectively
defend the networks against such perturbations. Our ap-
proach learns a Perturbation Rectifying Network (PRN) as
‘pre-input’ layers to a targeted model, such that the targeted
model needs no modification. The PRN is learned from real
and synthetic image-agnostic perturbations, where an ef-
ficient method to compute the latter is also proposed. A
perturbation detector is separately trained on the Discrete
Cosine Transform of the input-output difference of the PRN.
A query image is first passed through the PRN and verified
by the detector. If a perturbation is detected, the output of
the PRN is used for label prediction instead of the actual im-
age. A rigorous evaluation shows that our framework can
defend the network classifiers against unseen adversarial
perturbations in the real-world scenarios with up to 97.5%
success rate. The PRN also generalizes well in the sense
that training for one targeted network defends another net-
work with a comparable success rate.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks are at the heart of the current ad-
vancements in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
providing state-of-the-art performance on many challenging
classification tasks [9], [12], [14], [16], [36], [37]. However,
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [25] recently showed the possibil-
ity of fooling the deep networks to change their prediction
about ‘any’ image that is slightly perturbed with the Univer-
sal Adversarial Perturbations. For a given network model,
these image-agnostic (hence universal) perturbations can be
computed rather easily [25], [26]. The perturbations remain
Figure 1. Adding quasi-imperceptible universal adversarial pertur-
bations [25] can fool neural networks. The proposed framework
rectifies the images to restore the network predictions. The pat-
terns removed by rectification are separately analyzed to decide
on the presence of adversarial perturbations in images. The shown
‘perturbations’ and ‘removed patterns’ are normalized on different
scales for better visualization.
quasi-imperceptible (see Fig. 1), yet the adversarial exam-
ples generated by adding the perturbations to the images
fool the networks with alarmingly high probabilities [25].
Furthermore, the fooling is able to generalize well across
different network models.
Being image-agnostic, universal adversarial perturba-
tions can be conveniently exploited to fool models on-the-
fly on unseen images by using pre-computed perturbations.
This even eradicates the need of on-board computational
capacity that is needed for generating image-specific per-
turbations [7], [21]. This fact, along the cross-model gener-
alization of universal perturbations make them particularly
relevant to the practical cases where a model is deployed in
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a possibly hostile environment. Thus, defense against these
perturbations is a necessity for the success of Deep Learn-
ing in practice. The need for counter-measures against these
perturbations becomes even more pronounced considering
that the real-world scenes (e.g. sign boards on roads) modi-
fied by the adversarial perturbations can also behave as ad-
versarial examples for the networks [17].
This work proposes the first dedicated defense against
the universal adversarial perturbations [25]. The major con-
tributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose to learn a Perturbation Rectifying Network
(PRN) that is trained as the ‘pre-input’ of a targeted
network model. This allows our framework to provide
defense to already deployed networks without the need
of modifying them.
• We propose a method to efficiently compute synthetic
image-agnostic adversarial perturbations to effectively
train the PRN. The successful generation of these
perturbations complements the theoretical findings of
Moosavi-Dezfooli [26].
• We also propose a separate perturbation detector that
is learned from the Discrete Cosine Transform of the
image rectifications performed by the PRN for clean
and perturbed examples.
• Rigorous evaluation is performed by defending the
GoogLeNet [37], CaffeNet [16] and VGG-F net-
work [4]1, demonstrating up to 97.5% success rate on
unseen images possibly modified with unseen pertur-
bations. Our experiments also show that the proposed
PRN generalizes well across different network models.
2. Related work
The robustness of image classifiers against adversarial
perturbations has gained significant attention in the last few
years [6], [7], [29], [32], [34], [35], [40]. Deep neural
networks became the center of attention in this area after
Szegedy et al. [39] first demonstrated the existence of ad-
versarial perturbations for such networks. See [1] for a re-
cent review of literature in this direction. Szegedy et al. [39]
computed adversarial examples for the networks by adding
quasi-imperceptible perturbations to the images, where the
perturbations were estimated by maximizing the network’s
prediction error. Although these perturbations were image-
specific, it was shown that the same perturbed images were
able to fool multiple network models. Szegedy et al. re-
ported encouraging results for improving the model robust-
ness against the adversarial attacks by using adversarial ex-
amples for training, a.k.a. adversarial training.
1The choice of the networks is based on the computational feasibility
of generating the adversarial perturbations for the evaluation protocol in
Section 5. However, our approach is generic in nature.
Goodfellow et al. [10] built on the findings in [39] and
developed a ‘fast gradient sign method’ to efficiently gen-
erate adversarial examples that can be used for training the
networks. They hypothesized that it is the linearity of the
deep networks that makes them vulnerable to the adversar-
ial perturbations. However, Tanay and Griffin [41] later
constructed the image classes that do not suffer from the
adversarial examples for the linear classifiers. Their argu-
ments about the existence of the adversarial perturbations
again point towards the over-fitting phenomena, that can be
alleviated by regularization. Nevertheless, it remains un-
clear how a network should be regularized for robustness
against adversarial examples.
Moosavi-Dezfooli [27] proposed the DeepFool algo-
rithm to compute image-specific adversarial perturbations
by assuming that the loss function of the network is lin-
earizable around the current training sample. In contrast
to the one-step perturbation estimation [10], their approach
computes the perturbation in an iterative manner. They also
reported that augmenting training data with adversarial ex-
amples significantly increases the robustness of networks
against the adversarial perturbations. Baluja and Fischer [2]
trained an Adversarial Transformation Network to gener-
ate adversarial examples against a target network. Liu et
al. [19] analyzed the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples. They studied this property for both targeted and non-
targeted examples, and proposed an ensemble based ap-
proach to generate the examples with better transferability.
The above-mentioned techniques mainly focus on gener-
ating adversarial examples, and address the defense against
those examples with adversarial training. In-line with our
take on the problem, few recent techniques also directly fo-
cus on the defense against the adversarial examples. For in-
stance, Lu et al. [22] mitigate the issues resulting from the
adversarial perturbations using foveation. Their main ar-
gument is that the neural networks (for ImageNet [33]) are
robust to the foveation-induced scale and translation varia-
tions of the images, however, this property does not gener-
alize to the perturbation transformations.
Papernot et al. [30] used distillation [13] to make the
neural networks more robust against the adversarial pertur-
bations. However, Carlini and Wagner [3] later introduced
adversarial attacks that can not be defended by the distil-
lation method. Kurakin et al. [18] specifically studied the
adversarial training for making large models (e.g. Inception
v3 [38]) robust to perturbations, and found that the training
indeed provides robustness against the perturbations gen-
erated by the one-step methods [10]. However, Tramer et
al. [42] found that this robustness weakens for the adver-
sarial examples learned using different networks i.e. for the
black-box attacks [19]. Hence, ensemble adversarial train-
ing was proposed in [42] that uses adversarial examples
generated by multiple networks.
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Dziugaite et al. [5] studied the effects of JPG compres-
sion on adversarial examples and found that the compres-
sion can sometimes revert network fooling. Nevertheless,
it was concluded that JPG compression alone is insufficient
as a defense against adversarial attacks. Prakash et al. [31]
took advantage of localization of the perturbed pixels in
their defense. Lu et al. [20] proposed SafetyNet for detect-
ing and rejecting adversarial examples for the conventional
network classifiers (e.g. VGG19 [11]) that capitalizes on the
late stage ReLUs of the network to detect the perturbed ex-
amples. Similarly, a proposal of appending the deep neural
networks with detector subnetworks was also presented by
Metzen et al. [23]. In addition to the classification, adver-
sarial examples and robustness of the deep networks against
them have also been recently investigated for the tasks of
semantic segmentation and object detection [8], [21], [43].
Whereas the central topic of all the above-mentioned lit-
erature is the perturbations computed for individual images,
Moosavi-Dezfooli [25] were the first to show the existence
of image-agnostic perturbations for neural networks. These
perturbations were further analyzed in [26], whereas Met-
zen et al. [24] also showed their existence for semantic im-
age segmentation. To date, no dedicated technique exists
for defending the networks against the universal adversarial
perturbations, which is the topic of this paper.
3. Problem formulation
Below, we present the notions of universal adversarial
perturbations and the defense against them more formally.
Let =c ∈ Rd denote the distribution of the (clean) natural
images in a d-dimensional space, such that, a class label is
associated with its every sample Ic ∼ =c. Let C(.) be a
classifier (a deep network) that maps an image to its class
label, i.e. C(Ic) : Ic → ` ∈ R. The vector ρ ∈ Rd is
a universal adversarial perturbation for the classifier, if it
satisfies the following constraint:
P
Ic∼=c
(
C(Ic) 6= C(Ic + ρ)
)
≥ δ s.t. ||ρ||p ≤ ξ, (1)
where P(.) is the probability, ||.||p denotes the `p-norm of a
vector such that p ∈ [1,∞), δ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the fooling
ratio and ξ is a pre-defined constant. In the text to follow,
we alternatively refer to ρ as the perturbation for brevity.
In (1), the perturbations in question are image-agnostic,
hence Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [25] termed them universal2.
According to the stated definition, the parameter ξ controls
the norm of the perturbation. For the quasi-imperceptible
perturbations, the value of this parameter should be very
small as compared to the image norm ||Ic||p. On the other
hand, a larger δ is required for the perturbation to fool the
2A single perturbation that satisfies (1) for any classifier is referred as
‘doubly universal’ by Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [25]. We focus on the singly
universal perturbations in this work.
classifier with a higher probability. In this work, we let
δ ≥ 0.8 and consider the perturbations constrained by their
`2 and `∞ norms. For the `2-norm, we let ξ = 2, 000,
and select ξ = 10 for the `∞-norm perturbations. For both
types, these values are ∼ 4% of the means of the respective
image norms used in our experiments (in Section 5), which
is the same as [25].
To defend C(.) against the perturbations, we seek two
components of the defense mechanism. (1) A perturbation
‘detector’ D(Iρ/c) : Iρ/c → [0, 1] and (2) a perturbation
‘rectifier’ R(Iρ) : Iρ → Î, where Iρ = Ic + ρ. The
detector determines whether an unseen image Iρ/c is per-
turbed or clean. The objective of the rectifier is to com-
pute a transformation Î of the perturbed image such that
P
Ic∼=c
(
C (̂I) = C(Ic)
)
≈ 1. Notice that the rectifier does
not seek to improve the prediction of C(.) on the rectified
version of the image beyond the classifier’s performance on
the clean/original image. This ensures stable induction of
R(.). Moreover, the formulation allows us to compute Î
such that ||̂I− Ic||2 > 0. We leverage this property to learn
R(.) as the pre-input layers of C(.) in an end-to-end fashion.
4. Proposed approach
We draw on the insights from the literature reviewed in
Section 2 to develop a framework for defending a (possibly)
targeted network model against universal adversarial pertur-
bations. Figure 2 shows the schematics of our approach to
learn the ‘rectifier’ and the ‘detector’ components of the de-
fense framework. We use the Perturbation Rectifying Net-
work (PRN) as the ‘rectifier’, whereas a binary classifier is
eventually trained to detect the adversarial perturbations in
the images. The framework uses both real and synthetic
perturbations for training. The constituents of the proposed
framework are explained below.
4.1. Perturbation Rectifying Network (PRN)
At the core of our technique is the Perturbation Rectify-
ing Network (PRN), that is trained as pre-input layers to the
targeted network classifier. The PRN is attached to the first
layer of the classification network and the joint network is
trained to minimize the following cost:
J (θp,bp) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
L(`∗i , `i), (2)
where `∗i and `i are the labels predicted by the joint net-
work and the targeted network respectively, such that `i is
necessarily computed for the clean image. For the N train-
ing examples, L(.) computes the loss, whereas θp and bp
denote the PRN weight and bias parameters.
In Eq. (2) we define the cost over the parameters of PRN
only, which ensures that the (already deployed) targeted net-
3
Figure 2. Training schematics: From the clean data, image-agnostic perturbations are computed and augmented with the synthetic perturba-
tions. Both clean and perturbed images are fed to the Perturbation Rectifying Network (PRN). The PRN is learned by attaching it to the first
layer of the targeted network such that the parameters of the targeted network are kept frozen during the PRN training. The perturbation
detection mechanism extracts discriminative features from the difference between the inputs and outputs of the PRN and learns a binary
classifier. To classify an unseen test image Iρ/c, first D(Iρ/c) = B(F(Iρ/c − R(Iρ/c))) is computed. If a perturbation is detected then
R(Iρ/c) is used as the input to the classifier C(.) instead of the actual test image.
work does not require any modification for the defense be-
ing provided by our framework. This strategy is orthogonal
to the existing defense techniques that either update the tar-
geted model using adversarial training to make the networks
more robust [18], [42]; or incorporate architectural changes
to the targeted network, which may include adding a sub-
network to the model [23] or tapping into the activations of
certain layers to detect the adversarial examples [20]. Our
defense mechanism acts as an external wrapper for the tar-
geted network such that the PRN (and the detector) trained
to counter the adversarial attacks can be kept secretive in
order refrain from potential counter-counter attacks3. This
is a highly desirable property of defense frameworks in the
real-world scenarios. Moosavi-Dezfooli [25] noted that the
universal adversarial perturbations can still exist for a model
even after their adversarial training. The proposed frame-
work constitutionally caters for this problem.
We train the PRN using both clean and adversarial ex-
amples to ensure that the image transformation learned by
our network is not biased towards the adversarial examples.
For training, `i is computed separately with the targeted net-
work for the clean version of the ith training example. The
PRN is implemented as 5-ResNet blocks [12] sandwiched
by convolution layers. The 224×224×3 input image is fed
to Conv 3× 3, stride = 1, feature maps = 64, ‘same’ convo-
lution; followed by 5 ResNet blocks, where each block con-
sists of two convolution layers with ReLU activations [28],
resulting in 64 feature maps. The feature maps of the last
ResNet block are processed by Conv 3 × 3, stride = 1, fea-
ture maps = 16, ‘same’ convolution; and then Conv 3 × 3,
stride = 1, feature maps = 3, ‘same’ convolution.
3PRN+targeted network are end-to-end differentiable and the joint net-
work can be susceptible to stronger attacks if PRN is not secretive. How-
ever, stronger perturbations are also more easily detectable by our detector.
We use the cross-entropy loss [9] for training the PRN
with the help of ADAM optimizer [15]. The exponential de-
cay rates for the first and the second moment estimates are
set to 0.9 and 0.999 respectively. We set the initial learning
rate to 0.01, and decay it by 10% after each 1K iterations.
We used mini-batch size of 64, and trained the PRN for a
given targeted network for at least 5 epochs.
4.2. Training data
The PRN is trained using clean images as well as their
adversarial counterparts, constructed by adding perturba-
tions to the clean images. We compute the latter by first
generating a set of perturbations ρ ∈ P ⊆ Rd following
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [25]. Their algorithm computes a
universal perturbation in an iterative manner. In its inner
loop (ran over the training images), the algorithm seeks a
minimal norm vector [27] to fool the network on a given
image. The current estimate of ρ is updated by adding to
it the sought vector and back-projecting the resultant vec-
tor onto the `p ball of radius ξ. The outer loop ensures that
the desired fooling ratio is achieved over the complete train-
ing set. Generally, the algorithm requires several passes on
the training data to achieve an acceptable fooling ratio. We
refer to [25] for further details on the algorithm.
A PRN trained with more adversarial patterns underly-
ing the training images is expected to perform better. How-
ever, it becomes computationally infeasible to generate a
large (e.g. > 100) number of perturbations using the above-
mentioned algorithm. Therefore, we devise a mechanism to
efficiently generate synthetic perturbations ρs ∈ Ps ⊆ Rd
to augment the set of available perturbations for training
the PRN. The synthetic perturbations are computed using
the set P while capitalizing on the theoretical results of
[26]. To generate the synthetic perturbations, we com-
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Algorithm 1 `∞-norm synthetic perturbation generation
Input: Pre-generated perturbation samples P ⊆ Rd, num-
ber of new samples to be generated η, threshold ξ.
Output: Synthetic perturbations Ps ⊆ Rd
1: set Ps = {}; `2-threshold = E
[
{||ρi∈P ||2}|P|i=1
]
;
Pn = P with `2-normalized elements.
2: while |Ps| < η do
3: set ρs = 0
4: while ||ρs||∞ < ξ do
5: z ∼ unif(0, 1) ξ
6: ρs = ρs + (z  rand∼ Pn)
7: end while
8: if ||ρs||2 ≥ `2-threshold then
9: Ps = Ps
⋃
ρs
10: end if
11: end while
12: return
pute the vectors that satisfy the following conditions: (c1)
ρs ∈ Ψ+P : Ψ+P = positive orthant of the subspace spanned
by the elements of P . (c2) ||ρs||2 ≈ E [||ρ||2,∀ρ ∈ P] and
(c3)4 ||ρs||∞ ≈ ξ. The procedure for computing the syn-
thetic perturbations that are constrained by their `∞-norm
is summarized in Algorithm 1. We refer to the supplemen-
tary material of the paper for the algorithm to compute the
`2-norm perturbations.
To generate a synthetic perturbation, Algorithm 1
searches for ρs in Ψ
+
P by taking small random steps in the
directions governed by the unit vectors of the elements of
P . The random walk continues until the `∞-norm of ρs re-
mains smaller than ξ. The algorithm selects the found ρs as
a valid perturbation if the `2-norm of the vector is compa-
rable to the Expected value of the `2-norms of the vectors
in P . For generating the `2-norm perturbations, the cor-
responding algorithm given in the supplementary material
terminates the random walk based on ||ρs||2 in line-4, and
directly selects the computed ρs as the desired perturbation.
Analyzing the robustness of the deep networks against the
universal adversarial perturbations, Moosavi-Dezfooli [26]
showed the existence of shared directions (across different
data points) along which a decision boundary induced by
a network becomes highly positively curved. Along these
vulnerable directions, small universal perturbations exist
that can fool the network to change its predictions about
the labels of the data points. Our algorithms search for the
synthetic perturbations along those directions, whereas the
knowledge of the desired directions is borrowed from P .
Fig. 3 exemplifies the typical synthetic perturbations
generated by our algorithms for the `2 and `∞ norms. It
4For the perturbations restricted by their `2-norm only, this condition
is ignored. In that case, (c2) automatically ensures ||ρs||2 ≈ ξ.
Figure 3. Illustration of synthetic perturbations computed for the
CaffeNet [16]: The corresponding closest matches in set P are
also shown. The dot product between the vectorized perturbations
with their closest matches are 0.71 and 0.83 respectively for the `2
and `∞-norm perturbations.
also shows the corresponding closest matches in the set P
for the given perturbations. The fooling ratios for the syn-
thetic perturbations is generally not as high as the original
ones, nevertheless the values remain in an acceptable range.
In our experiments (Section 5), augmenting the training data
with the synthetic perturbations consistently helped in early
convergence and better performance of the PRN. We note
that the acceptable fooling ratios demonstrated by the syn-
thetic perturbations in this work complement the theoretical
findings in [26]. Once the set of synthetic perturbations Ps
is computed, we construct P∗ = P⋃Ps and use it to per-
turb the images in our training data.
4.3. Perturbation detection
While studying the JPG compression as a mechanism
to mitigate the effects of the (image-specific) adversarial
perturbations, Dziugaite et al. [5] also suggested the Dis-
crete Cosine Transform (DCT) as a possible candidate to
reduce the effectiveness of the perturbations. Our experi-
ments, reported in supplementary material, show that the
DCT based compression can also be exploited to reduce the
network fooling ratios under the universal adversarial per-
turbations. However, it becomes difficult to decide on the
required compression rate, especially when it is not known
whether the image in question is actually perturbed or not.
Unnecessary rectification often leads to degraded perfor-
mance of the networks on the clean images.
Instead of using the DCT to remove the perturbations, we
exploit it for perturbation detection in our approach. Using
the training data that contains both clean and perturbed im-
ages, say Itrainρ/c , we first compute F(Itrainρ/c − R(Itrainρ/c)) and
then learn a binary classifier B(F) → [0, 1] with the data
labels denoting the input being ‘clean’ or ‘perturbed’. We
implement F(.) to compute the log-absolute values of the
2D-DCT coefficients of the gray-scaled image in the ar-
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gument, whereas an SVM is learned as B(.). The func-
tion D(.) = B(F(.)) forms the detector component of
our defense framework. To classify a test image Iρ/c, we
first evaluate D(Iρ/c), and if a perturbation is detected
then C(R(Iρ/c)) is evaluated for classification instead of
C(Iρ/c), where C(.) denotes the targeted network classifier.
5. Experiments
We evaluated the performance of our technique by
defending CaffeNet [16], VGG-F network [4] and
GoogLeNet [37] against universal adversarial perturbations.
The choice of the networks is based on the computational
feasibility of generating the perturbations for our experi-
mental protocol. The same framework is applicable to other
networks. Following Moosavi-Dezfooli [25], we used the
ILSVRC 2012 [16] validation set of 50, 000 images to per-
form the experiments.
Setup: From the available images, we randomly selected
10, 000 samples to generate a total of 50 image-agnostic
perturbations for each network, such that 25 of those per-
turbations were constrained to have `∞-norm equal to 10,
whereas the `2-norm of the remaining 25 was restricted to
2, 000. The fooling ratio of all the perturbations was lower-
bounded by 0.8. Moreover, the maximum dot product be-
tween any two perturbations of the same type (i.e. `2 or
`∞) was upper bounded by 0.15. This ensured that the con-
structed perturbations were significantly different from each
other, thereby removing any potential bias from our evalu-
ation. From each set of the 25 perturbations, we randomly
selected 20 perturbations to be used with the training data,
and the remaining 5 were used with the testing data.
We extended the sets of the training perturbations us-
ing the method discussed in Section 4.2, such that there
were total 250 perturbations in each extended set, hence-
forth denoted as P∗∞ and P∗2 . To generate the training data,
we first randomly selected 40, 000 samples from the avail-
able images and performed 5 corner crops of dimensions
224 × 224 × 3 to generate 200, 000 samples. For creating
the adversarial examples with the `2-type perturbations, we
used the set P∗2 and randomly added perturbations to the
images with 0.5 probability. This resulted in ∼ 100, 000
samples each for the clean and the perturbed images, which
were used to train the approach for the `2-norm perturba-
tions for a given network. We repeated this procedure using
the set P∗∞ to separately train it for the `∞-type perturba-
tions. Note that, for a given targeted network we performed
the training twice to evaluate the performance of our tech-
nique for both types of perturbations.
For a thorough evaluation, two protocols were followed
to generate the testing data. Both protocols used the unseen
10, 000 images that were perturbed with the 5 unseen test-
ing perturbations. Notice that the evaluation has been kept
doubly-blind to emulate the real-world scenario for a de-
ployed network. For Protocol-A, we used the whole 10, 000
test images and randomly corrupted them with the 5 test
perturbations with a 0.5 probability. For the Protocol-B, we
chose the subset of the 10, 000 test images that were cor-
rectly classified by the targeted network in their clean form,
and corrupted that subset with 0.5 probability using the 5
testing perturbations. The existence of both clean and per-
turbed images with equal probability in our test sets espe-
cially ensures a fair evaluation of the detector.
Evaluation metric: We used four different metrics for a
comprehensive analysis of the performance of our tech-
nique. Let Ic and Iρ denote the sets containing clean and
perturbed test images. Similarly, let Îρ and Îρ/c be the sets
containing the test images rectified by PRN, such that all
the images in Îρ were perturbed (before passing through
the PRN) whereas the images in Îρ/c were similarly per-
turbed with 0.5 probability, as per our protocol. Let
∗
I be
the set comprising the test images such that each image is
rectified by the PRN only if it were classified as perturbed
by the detector D. Furthermore, let acc(.) be the function
computing the prediction accuracy of the target network on
a given set of images. The formal definitions of the metrics
that we used in our experiments are stated below:
1. PRN-gain (%) = acc(Îρ)−acc(Iρ)
acc(Îρ) × 100.
2. PRN-restoration (%) = acc(Îρ/c)acc(Ic) × 100.
3. Detection rate (%) = Accuracy of D.
4. Defense rate (%) = acc(
∗
I)
acc(Ic) × 100.
The names of the metric are in accordance with the se-
mantic notions associated with them. Notice that the PRN-
restoration is defined over the rectification of both clean and
perturbed images. We do this to account for any loss in the
classification accuracy of the targeted network incurred by
the rectification of the clean images by the PRN. It was ob-
served in our experiments that unnecessary rectification of
the clean images can sometimes lead to a minor (1 - 2%)
reduction in the classification accuracy of the targeted net-
work. Hence, we used a more strict definition of the restora-
tion by PRN for a more transparent evaluation. This defi-
nition is also in-line with our underlying assumption of the
practical scenarios where we do not know a prior if the test
image is clean or perturbed.
Same/Cross-norm evaluation: In Table 1, we summa-
rize the results of our experiments for defending the
GoogLeNet [37] against the perturbations. The table sum-
marizes two kinds of experiments. For the first kind, we
used the same types of perturbations for testing and training.
For instance, we used the `2-type perturbations for learning
the framework components (rectifier + detector) and then
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Figure 4. Representative examples to visualize the perturbed images and their rectified version computed by the PRN. The labels predicted
by the networks along the prediction confidence are also given. The examples are provided for the `∞-type perturbations. Please refer to
the supplementary material of the paper for more examples.
Table 1. Defense summary for the GoogLeNet [37]: The mentioned types of the perturbations (i.e. `2 or `∞) are for the testing data.
Metric
Same test/train perturbation type Different test/train perturbation type
`2-type `∞-type `2-type `∞-type
Prot-A Prot-B Prot-A Prot-B Prot-A Prot-B Prot-A Prot-B
PRN-gain (%) 77.0 77.1 73.9 74.2 76.4 77.0 72.6 73.4
PRN-restoration (%) 97.0 92.4 95.6 91.3 97.1 92.7 93.8 89.3
Detection rate (%) 94.6 94.6 98.5 98.4 92.4 92.3 81.3 81.2
Defense rate (%) 97.4 94.8 96.4 93.7 97.5 94.9 94.3 91.6
also used the `2-type perturbations for testing. The results
of these experiments are summarized in the left half of the
table. We performed the ‘same test/train perturbation type’
experiments for both `2 and `∞ perturbations, for both test-
ing protocols (denoted as Prot-A and Prot-B in the table). In
the second kind of experiments, we trained our framework
on one type of perturbation and tested for the other. The
right half of the table summarizes the results of those exper-
iments. The mentioned perturbation types in the table are
for the testing data. The same conventions will be followed
in the similar tables for the other two targeted networks be-
low. Representative examples to visualize the perturbed and
rectified images (by the PRN) are shown in Fig. 4. Please
refer to the supplementary material for more illustrations.
From Table 1, we can see that in general, our framework
is able to defend the GoogLeNet very successfully against
the universal adversarial perturbations that are specifically
targeted at this network. The Prot-A captures the perfor-
mance of our framework when an attacker might have added
a perturbation to an unseen image without knowing if the
clean image would be correctly classified by the targeted
network. The Prot-B represents the case where the pertur-
bation is added to fool the network on an image that it had
previously classified correctly. Note that the difference in
the performance of our framework for Prot-A and Prot-B is
related to the accuracy of the targeted network on clean im-
ages. For a network that is 100% accurate on clean images,
the results under Prot-A and Prot-B would match exactly.
The results would differ more for the less accurate classi-
fiers, as also evident from the subsequent tables.
In Table 2, we summarize the performance of our frame-
work for the CaffeNet [16]. Again, the results demonstrate
a good defense against the perturbations. The final Defense-
rate for the `2-type perturbation for Prot-A is 96.4%. Un-
der the used metric definition and the experimental protocol,
one interpretation of this value is as follows. With the de-
fense wrapper provided by our framework, the performance
of the CaffeNet is expected to be 96.4% of its original per-
formance (in the perfect world of clean images), such that
there is an equal chance of every query image to be per-
turbed or clean5. Considering that the fooling rate of the
network was at least 80% on all the test perturbations used
in our experiments, it is a good performance recovery.
In Table 3, the defense summary for the VGG-F net-
work [4] is reported, which again shows a decent perfor-
mance of our framework. Interestingly, for both CaffeNet
and VGG-F, the existence of the `∞-type perturbations in
the test images could be detected very accurately by our de-
tector for the ‘different test/train perturbation type’. How-
ever, it was not the case for the GoogLeNet. We found that
for the `∞-type perturbations (with ξ = 10) the correspond-
ing `2-norm of the perturbations was generally much lower
for the GoogLeNet (∼ 2, 400 on avg.) as compared to the
CaffeNet and VGG-F (∼ 2, 850 on avg.). This made the
detection of the `∞-type perturbations more challenging for
the GoogLeNet. The dissimilarity in these values indicate
that there is a significant difference between the decision
5We emphasize that our evaluation protocols and metrics are carefully
designed to analyze the performance in the real-world situations where it
is not known apriori whether the query is perturbed or clean.
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Table 2. Defense summary for the CaffeNet [16]: The mentioned types of the perturbations (i.e. `2 or `∞) are for the testing data.
Metric
Same test/train perturbation type Different test/train perturbation type
`2-type `∞-type `2-type `∞-type
Prot-A Prot-B Prot-A Prot-B Prot-A Prot-B Prot-A Prot-B
PRN-gain (%) 67.2 69.0 78.4 79.1 65.3 66.8 77.3 77.7
PRN-restoration (%) 95.1 89.9 93.6 88.7 92.2 87.1 91.7 85.8
Detection rate (%) 98.1 98.0 97.8 97.9 84.2 84.0 97.9 98.0
Defense rate (%) 96.4 93.6 95.2 92.5 93.6 90.1 93.2 90.0
Table 3. Defense summary for the VGG-F network [4]: The mentioned types of the perturbations (i.e. `2 or `∞) are for the testing data.
Metric
Same test/train perturbation type Different test/train perturbation type
`2-type `∞-type `2-type `∞-type
Prot-A Prot-B Prot-A Prot-B Prot-A Prot-B Prot-A Prot-B
PRN-gain (%) 72.1 73.3 84.1 84.3 68.3 69.2 84.7 84.8
PRN-restoration (%) 93.2 86.2 90.3 83.2 88.8 81.2 91.1 83.3
Detection rate (%) 92.5 92.5 98.6 98.6 92.5 92.5 98.1 98.1
Defense rate (%) 95.5 91.4 92.2 87.9 90.0 85.9 93.7 89.1
boundaries induced by the GoogLeNet and the other two
networks, which is governed by the significant architectural
differences of the networks.
Cross-architecture generalisation: With the above obser-
vation, it was anticipated that the cross-network defense
performance of our framework would be better for the net-
works with the (relatively) similar architectures. This pre-
diction was verified by the results of our experiments in Ta-
bles 4 and 5. These tables show the performance for `2 and
`∞-type perturbations where we used the ‘same test/train
perturbation type’. The results are reported for protocol A.
For the corresponding results under protocol B, we refer
to the supplementary material. From these tables, we can
conclude that our framework generalizes well across differ-
ent networks, especially across the networks that have (rel-
atively) similar architectures. We conjecture that the cross-
network generalization is inherited by our framework from
the cross-model generalization of the universal adversarial
perturbations. Like our technique, any framework for the
defense against these perturbations can be expected to ex-
hibit similar characteristics.
6. Conclusion
We presented the first dedicated framework for the de-
fense against universal adversarial perturbations [25] that
not only detects the presence of these perturbations in the
images but also rectifies the perturbed images so that the
targeted classifier can reliably predict their labels. The
proposed framework provides defense to a targeted model
without the need of modifying it, which makes our tech-
nique highly desirable for the practical cases. Moreover, to
prevent the potential counter-counter measures, it provides
the flexibility of keeping its ‘rectifier’ and ‘detector’ com-
ponents secretive. We implement the ‘rectifier’ as a Pertur-
bation Rectifying Network (PRN), whereas the ‘detector’
is implemented as an SVM trained by exploiting the im-
Table 4. `2-type cross-network defense (Prot-A): Testing is done
using the perturbations generated on the networks in the left-most
column. The networks to generate the training perturbations are
indicated in the second row.
PRN-restoration (%)
VGG-F CaffeNet GoogLeNet
VGG-F [4] 93.2 88.9 81.7
CaffeNet [16] 91.3 95.1 72.0
GoogLeNet [37] 84.7 85.9 97.0
Defense rate (%)
VGG-F CaffeNet GoogLeNet
VGG-F [4] 95.5 91.5 82.4
CaffeNet [16] 94.8 96.2 77.3
GoogLeNet [37] 88.3 87.3 97.4
Table 5. `∞-type cross-network defense summary (Prot-A).
PRN-restoration (%)
VGG-F CaffeNet GoogLeNet
VGG-F [4] 90.3 86.9 74.1
CaffeNet [16] 85.7 93.6 69.3
GoogLeNet [37] 85.9 83.3 95.6
Defense rate (%)
VGG-F CaffeNet GoogLeNet
VGG-F [4] 92.2 88.9 74.8
CaffeNet [16] 93.5 95.2 73.8
GoogLeNet [37] 88.4 85.4 96.4
age transformations performed by the PRN. For an effective
training, we also proposed a method to efficiently compute
image-agnostic perturbations synthetically. The efficacy of
our framework is demonstrated by a successful defense of
CaffeNet [16], VGG-F network [4] and GoogLeNet [37]
against the universal adversarial perturbations.
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